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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The impetus for this report by the Senate Committee on Post Audit and
Oversight came from widespread concern about the soaring cost of home heating
oil this winter. Faced with record-low temperatures, Massachusetts residents
were forced to use unprecedented amounts of oil in order to keep warm. At the
same time, the retail price for home heating oil shot up by 68 percent over last
year's price. These two factors combined to create a crisis in home heating oil,
costing Massachusetts consumers millions of dollars in additional fuel payments.
Furthermore, the nature of the oil industry puts Massachusetts consumers at
continued risk of similar price increases if there is another prolonged cold spell.
This report by the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight describes
some of the factors in the dramatic rise in home heating oil prices and analyzes
the role of the oil industry during this crisis. The Committee's major findings
are summarized below:
A. FACTORS AFFECTING THE RISE IN OIL PRICES
• The northern hemisphere suffered the coldest December
of the century in 1989, creating extraordinary demand for oil.
Regional inventories of oil were unusually low, and oil companies were
unprepared for the sudden surge in consumer demand created by the cold
weather.
A shortage of domestic ships and congestion in U.S. ports may have
worsened the impact of the cold weather and low regional oil inventories.
B. THE CHANGING OIL INDUSTRY
• Control of the oil industry has become less concentrated, shifting power
away from a few companies and the oil-producing nations to an
international array of producers, refiners, and other industry
participants.
• In response to these changes in the oil industry, the New York Mercantile
Exchange introduced futures contracts for home heating oil. The
prospect of profit from these contracts attracted speculators to the oil
market.
• Because of increased competition within the oil industry and price
speculation by non-industry participants, wholesalers have become less
able to predict oil prices and are more reluctant to keep large inventories.
• Lower oil inventories reduce wholesalers' risks from possible declines in
oil prices, but they also increase vulnerability to sudden changes in
demand.
C. THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS IN THE CRISIS
• Retailers did not cause the increase in oil prices, but they benefitted
from larger sales volumes during the oil crisis and from wider profit
margins in the aftermath of the crisis.
• Companies that had large inventories of oil and companies that were able
to refine crude oil into heating oil made the most profit from higher oil
prices. However, the availability of oil inventories may have prevented
even greater price increases to consumers.
D. RESPONSES TO THE OIL CRISIS
• Massachusetts should work with other state and federal offices to
examine the need for nation-wide regional oil reserves. Such reserves
would be maintained to meet fuel needs during defense or consumer
emergencies.
• The federal government should re-consider its policies regarding the
transportation of cargoes between U.S. ports during emergencies. These
policies should ensure that sufficient vessels arc available to transport
essential items such as food and fuel during times of extreme need.
• Massachusetts should extend continued political and financial support
for monitoring oil prices and inventories. Such monitoring would enable
the state to better avert emergencies such as this December's oil crisis.
n
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INTRODUCTION
The oil industry has been the subject of intense scrutiny and concern this
winter. Massachusetts was struck by bitterly-cold weather, and the price for
home heating oil soared to unprecedented heights. The impact of this price
increase grew to crisis proportions, as Massachusetts consumers faced the dual
burdens of record-high oil prices and record-low temperatures.
In this report, the Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight describes the
impact that rising oil prices had on Massachusetts residents, and analyzes some
of the factors affecting the rapid price increase. The report presents relevant
information about the structure of the oil industry, along with a summary of
governmental activities in response to the oil crisis. Finally, the report offers
recommendations for reducing the impact of fluctuations in oil prices in the
future.
THE REAL IMPACT OF THE OIL CRISIS
Oil consumers, who make up 54 percent of Massachusetts residents, bore the
brunt of increases in home heating oil prices this winter. 1 According to the Fair
Share Development Corporation, the oil crisis cost Massachusetts consumers an
average of $4 million per day in additional fuel payments. 2 Low-income
families and the elderly were particularly hard-hit, as escalating oil prices
depleted limited household budgets and fuel assistance funds.
1 Larry Tye, "Bay State's heating oil prices falling in January," Boston Globe
(January 12, 1990).
2 Fair Share Development Corporation, "Oil Supplies Cut and Prices Double
(press release)" (December 29, 1989), p. I. According to Fair Share's Robert
Mitchell, the $4 million figure was calculated by multiplying average oil
consumption (.13 gallon per degree day per customer), average degree days
during the oil crisis (40.0), number of Massachusetts oil consumers (1.3 million),
and average added cost per gallon of oil during the crisis ($0.60).
Figure 1: Retail heating oil prices
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Figure 1: Retail heating oil prices illustrates monthly changes in oil prices from
January 1989 to February 1990. As shown in Figure 1 . the retail price for home
heating oil in Massachusetts had been relatively stable over the past year,
remaining at about 90 cents per gallon. Only in December 1989 did prices rise
significantly above this level.
During the month of December, Massachusetts consumers saw oil prices jump
by an average of over thirteen cents per week. On January 2, 1990, the average
retail price for home heating oil in Massachusetts was $1.51 per gallon—a 55
percent increase from the December 4, 1989 price of $0.97, and a 68 percent
increase from the price one year earlier.
Fortunately, home heating oil prices have fallen since early January. By
February 5, 1990, the retail price of oil was down to $1.06 per gallon—a
reduction of 45 cents (30 percent) from the previous month's price. Although
the heating oil crisis seems to be over, it is crucial to understand why oil prices
changed so quickly and drastically this winter. Only then can the state take
action to ensure that this crisis will not be repeated.
FACTORS AFFECTING THE RISE IN OIL PRICES
The rapid rise in the price of home heating oil in Massachusetts can be
attributed to a combination of factors, including extremely cold weather, low
heating oil inventory levels, and transportation problems.
1. Cold weather
a. The northern hemisphere suffered the coldest December of the century in
1989, creating extraordinary demand for oil.
Figure 2: Boston degree-dav data compares cumulative degree-day figures from
this winter to the 30-year average for this time of year. The degree-day figure,
a measure of fuel consumption, is determined by how far the daily mean
temperature falls below 65 degrees. The greater the degree-day figure, the
colder the temperature.
The Greater Boston area suffered a significant drop in temperature in the weeks
following Thanksgiving of 1989, reflected in Figure 2 by the sharp rise in the
cumulative degree-day figure. By Christmas Eve of 1989, the National Weather
3500
Figure 2: Boston degree-day data
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Service announced that Boston had suffered the coldest December since 1876. 3
Similar weather conditions were felt throughout the New England region.
As temperatures dropped to record lows, consumer demand for home heating oil
increased sharply. At the peak of the oil crisis, regional demand for oil grew
to 40-45 percent more than normal winter demand. 4 With consumers' increased
demand for the existing supply of oil, prices rose significantly.
In past winters, New England had been able to rely on excess oil from Western
3 Jeffrey Raynes, "Statement of Jeffrey W. Raynes, CAE, President and
Chief Executive Officer, Better Home Heat Council, to the Massachusetts
General Court, Joint Committee on Energy" (January 16, 1990), p. 5.
4 Letter from T.C. DeLoach, Vice-President, Mobil Oil Corporation, to the
Honorable Michael S. Dukakis (January 9, 1990), p. 1.
Europe to meet its emergency fuel needs. However, December 1989 brought cold
temperatures to the entire northern hemisphere, including Western Europe and
the Soviet Union. As a result, European-bound tankers that would normally
have delivered excess oil to New England were not available.
b. The cold spell occurred early in the winter season and caught everyone-
particularly the oil industry—unprepared.
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Figure 3: Total degree-days by month
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Figure 3: Total degree-davs by month compares monthly degree-day information
from this winter to the 30-year average. Total monthly degree-days provide a
measure of how cold temperatures were in a given month. As temperatures fall,
the total degree-days for the month increase.
As shown in Figure 3 . data from the past thirty years indicate that temperatures
typically get colder from November to January and tend to grow warmer from
January onward. Data from this winter season, however, reveal that New
England deviated from the normal trend in temperature fluctuations.
Temperatures in November and December of 1989 were unusually cold, while
January 1990 was significantly warmer than both the previous month and the
30-year average for January.
This deviation from normal temperature fluctuations caught everyone off-
guard. The oil industry, in particular, was unprepared for the early drop in
temperature and the ensuing rise in demand for home heating oil. Production
and delivery schedules are typically planned to correspond with anticipated
levels of demand. According to some industry analysts, "had it occurred in
January, as expected, the cold snap would have caused little problem." 5
c. Cold weather caused other problems, exacerbating the home heating oil
shortage.
Cold weather has been blamed for production and delivery problems in the oil
industry. These problems include the December 24th explosion at Exxon's Baton
Rouge, Louisiana refinery; frozen locks on the Mississippi River; and weather-
related closures of refineries throughout the nation.
The unusually cold weather also put unprecedented pressure on other energy
sources. Certain commercial and industrial gas customers—known as
"interruptibles"--experienced cutbacks in service.6 Electric customers in the
David Warsh, "When feeling is believing," Boston Globe (January 7, 1990).
6
"Interruptible" service is typically offered to commercial and industrial
customers by regional gas distributors. Distributors contract to provide gas to
these customers during warm months, with the understanding that service may
Northeast nearly suffered a blackout in early December because of excessive
demand and strained supplies.7 Oil industry analysts claim that some of these
gas and electric customers turned to home heating oil.
Drought conditions in Canada further worsened the crisis in home heating oil.
Electric utilities in the Northeast had planned on drawing from Canadian
hydroelectric sources this winter; instead, low water levels in Quebec and
elsewhere actually forced Canadian utilities to buy from U.S. power sources.
In order to meet peak demand, electric utilities fired up their oil-burning
combustion turbines, putting additional pressure on the strained oil market. 8
2. Low inventory levels
a. Regional oil inventory levels in New England were unusually low this year.
New England wholesalers had lower-than-average inventories of oil at the start
of the 1989-1990 heating season. This reduction in the regional supply of home
heating oil proved to have near-disastrous consequences. Faced with increased
consumer demand and limited wholesale supply, some regional oil retailers
reported that they were unable to serve all their regular customers.
Figure 4: New England oil inventories compares New England oil inventory
levels for the average heating season (based on the past five years) with
preliminary inventory figures for this year. As illustrated in Figure 4 . oil
be interrupted during peak-load seasons. According to Jeffrey Rayncs of the
Better Home Heat Council, over 50 percent of all gas in the pipeline system is
designated as "interruptible."
7 Raynes, pp. 3-4.
8 Raynes, pp. 3-4.
Figure 4: New England oil inventories
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inventory levels typically reach their peak in November—as wholesalers prepare
for the onslaught of winter—and decline as the season progresses.
Figure 4 shows that regional oil inventories were significantly lower at the
beginning of this winter than in previous years. October regional oil
inventories were over 2 million barrels short of the 5-year average—a reduction
of almost 25 percent. By November, regional supplies of oil were down 3.26
million barrels—or 32 percent—from previous years' levels.
Regional oil wholesalers offer several explanations for their lower-than-average
inventory levels. Some wholesalers claim that they expected oil prices to
decline, so they started the winter with low inventories in hopes of buying
cheaper oil later in the season. These expectations were fostered by rumors that
8
the OPEC nations would reach a stalemate during their annual meeting in
November. Moreover, wholesalers claim that warnings about the effects of
"global warming" strengthened fears of another exceptionally mild winter, and
they responded by reducing inventory levels.
In addition, some wholesalers assert that they had lost money last year because
of excess oil left after an unusually warm winter. Wholesalers made less profit
on this excess oil, due to lower springtime oil prices and to the costs associated
with insuring and maintaining inventories. Accordingly, these wholesalers set
lower inventory levels for this winter.
Figure 5: End-of-season inventories
Spring 1989 vs. 5-year average
Millions of barrels
Spring 1989 WA 5- Year Average
American Petroleum Institute
Data from the American Petroleum Institute, however, place into question
wholesalers' claims of excess inventory. Figure 5: End-of-season inventories
compares regional inventories of oil from March to May of 1989, to the five-
year average for the same months. Figure 5 reveals that oil inventory levels last
spring were comparable to—if not lower than—inventory levels in previous years.
3. Transportation problems
a. There may have been an insufficient number of domestic vessels to transport
the needed quantity of oil.
As demand for oil reached unprecedented levels this winter, so did demand for
oil-transporting vessels. According to the oil industry and the U.S. Energy
Department, the number of available domestic vessels was insufficient to meet
demand for oil, and foreign vessels that could have eased the shortage were
prevented by federal law from making deliveries.9 However, information from
the U.S. Maritime Administration contradicts these allegations, indicating that
vessel availability was not a problem during the December oil crisis. 10
The federal law in controversy is the Merchant Marine Act of 1920—commonly
known as the "Jones Act." The Jones Act places certain restrictions on shipping
in the United States:
No merchandise shall be transported by water, or by land and
water . . . between points in the United States ... in any other
vessel than a vessel built in and documented under the laws of
the United States and owned by persons who are citizens of the
United States. 11
9 Allanna Sullivan, "Maritime Agency Blocked Fuel Shipment That May
Have Eased Regional Shortage," Wall Street Journal (January 8, 1990).
10 Critics of the Jones Act claim that the definition of "availability" may not
be sufficiently specific in all circumstances. For example, during the December
1989 oil crisis, vessels that were deemed "available" may not actually have been
accessible for several weeks.
11 46 U.S.C. 883.
10
The Jones Act was established to protect and develop American merchant
marine, ship building, and sea personnel. 12 According to a Maritime
Administration spokesman, waivers to the Jones Act are generally reserved for
national defense purposes, and waivers are rarely granted for commercial
reasons.
13
Applications for commercial waivers must be submitted to and approved by the
U.S. Customs Service of the Treasury Department. The Customs Service usually
consults with the Defense Department and Maritime Administration during
the waiver approval process, and the Energy Department may be asked to make
recommendations on proposed energy shipments.
During the oil crisis, the Customs Service received six applications for waivers
to the Jones Act: three for home heating oil shipments and three for propane
deliveries. 14 The Customs Service contacted the Maritime Administration,
which in turn approached members of the domestic tanker industry, to assess
the availability of U.S. vessels.
The Maritime Administration determined that there were enough U.S. vessels
to move the heating oil within a reasonable time period, but there were no U.S.
vessels to handle the proposed shipments of propane. The Customs Service
accordingly denied the three waiver applications for home heating oil and
12 Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest . C.A.La.1976, 537 F.2d 1272.
13 Telephone interview with Walter Oates, Office of External Affairs, U.S.
Maritime Administration.
14 Letter from Captain Warren G. Leback, Maritime Administrator, U.S.
Department of Transportation, to the House of Representatives (February 1,
1990), p. 2.
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granted two of the three propane waivers.
In the history of the Jones Act, only 150 waivers have been granted. 15 The
Energy Department, oil industry, and consumer groups have criticized the Jones
Act for being overly protectionist. These critics claim that the Jones Act should
be amended to allow for waivers during consumer emergencies such as the
December oil crisis. The Customs Service and Maritime Administration,
however, assert that the waiver process worked during the oil crisis and
question whether such amendments are necessary.
b. The increase in shipping traffic may have caused congestion and delays in
U.S. ports.
Representatives from the oil industry have blamed "berth congestion" for
aggravating the oil crisis. 16 As more vessels engaged in transporting oil during
the crisis, some U.S. ports may have experienced increased congestion and other
traffic-related problems.
Berth congestion does not appear to have been a problem in Boston Harbor,
however. In response to inquiries by the Senate Post Audit and Oversight
Bureau, representatives from Massport, the Coast Guard, and the Boston Harbor
Pilots Association have stated that harbor conditions were not overly congested
during the oil crisis. While they acknowledge that traffic into Boston Harbor
increased in December, these representatives assert that there were no noticeable
delays or back-ups in port activity.
15 Sullivan, "Maritime Agency Blocked."
16
Piatt's Oilgram (December 19, 1989), p. 7A.
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THE CHANGING OIL INDUSTRY AND ITS ROLE IN THE CRISIS
The price of home heating oil this winter was affected by cold temperatures,
low inventory levels, and transportation problems. However, these conditions
alone do not explain why oil prices rose to such heights. In order to understand
the oil crisis, it is important to consider the interaction of these conditions with
particular aspects of the oil industry.
The oil industry has undergone significant changes over the past twenty years.
Up until the 1970s, a few major oil companies held control over the oil industry.
With the creation of OPEC, control of the industry shifted to several oil-
producing nations. More recently, the industry has been shaped by an
international array of producers, refiners, and other industry participants.
These changes have created additional competition between oil companies and
have had an impact on both inventory and price levels for home heating oil.
1. The changing oil industry
In November 1978, the New York Mercantile Exchange introduced the first
futures contracts on home (or "No. 2") heating oil. The futures market for home
heating oil developed in response to the changes within the oil industry, and
it quickly attracted a large number of speculators as well as industry
participants.
Most oil speculators are not involved in the actual oil industry, but they trade
in the futures market in order to make a profit. In contrast, oil refiners,
wholesalers, and other industry participants use the futures market as a "hedge"
against changes in the value of oil. By doing so, these industry participants
13
reduce risk and protect profit margins.
"Hedging" involves taking opposite positions (i.e., buying and selling)
simultaneously in the futures and physical markets, so that losses in one market
are balanced by gains in the other. For example, a wholesaler buys a quantity
of oil, but he wants to protect the oil from future declines in price. Such
declines would reduce the value of his inventory and force the wholesaler to
absorb financial losses. The wholesaler therefore engages in the opposite
transaction (i.e., selling) on the futures market in order to balance the risks on
his physical product.
In this case, the wholesaler would contract to sell oil in the future at a
somewhat higher price than the current market price. If the price of oil goes
down, the wholesaler's inventory becomes less valuable, but he makes money
from selling the oil at the contract price. If, on the other hand, the price of oil
goes up, the wholesaler's inventory becomes more valuable, but he may lose
money if the market price for oil exceeds the contract price.
By his use of hedging techniques, the wholesaler minimizes his risks from
swings in oil prices. In contrast, speculators assume risks in the market, hoping
to gain from unanticipated changes in oil prices. The heightened activity of
hedgers and speculators in the oil market has affected both inventory and price
levels.
2. The impact of the changing oil industry on inventory levels
The emergence of oil futures and speculators is symptomatic of the oil
industry's loss of control over price levels. Wholesalers are less able to predict
14
changes in oil prices and have consequently become reluctant to keep large
inventories of oil on hand. According to an analyst on the MacNeil/Lehrer
Newshour :
With big inventories you'd risk having too much inventory in a
warm winter and your costs would rise for storage, cleaning up
messes. . . . These higher inventory costs would simply be passed
along to . . . customers. 17
While hedging on the futures market reduces some of this risk, wholesalers
protect themselves from volatile oil prices by cutting down their inventory
levels.
Unfortunately, shrinking inventories mean thinner margins of error.
Wholesalers with small reserves of oil may be unable to accommodate sudden
increases in demand. This increased vulnerability to changes in demand
contributed to the December 1989 oil crisis.
While they generally reduce business risk, smaller inventories do not always
work to the advantage of the oil industry. Wholesalers that started this winter
with small inventories were faced with empty tanks and high oil prices by late
December. Meanwhile, those with large inventories enjoyed substantial profits
as the value of oil began to skyrocket.
3. The impact of reduced oil inventories on pricing
Industry-wide reductions in oil inventory levels have resulted in pricing
consistencies among wholesalers. Because they now have smaller inventories of
oil, wholesalers are constantly in the market for oil. With this increased market
activity, wholesalers adjust their prices to keep pace with their competitors.
17 Paul Solman, "Heated Up," MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (January 12, 1990).
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Richard Slifka of Global Petroleum Corporation (an oil wholesaler) testified to
the Massachusetts Energy Committee that it is nearly impossible today for an
oil company to charge significantly more or less than its competitors. 18 Dealers
that charge less than their competition quickly sell all of their oil, while dealers
that charge more are unable to attract business.
Moreover, wholesalers argue that competitors who offer lower-than-average
prices may, in fact, be hurting their long-term customers. As new customers
flock to the lowest-priced dealer, oil supplies are depleted and long-term
customers are forced to look elsewhere for oil. In a tight supply situation such
as this past December, oil dealers cannot fluctuate far from their competitors'
prices without compromising their long-term customers' needs.
4. The role of industry participants in the oil crisis
All segments of the oil industry have come under fire recently as a result of
the massive increases in home heating oil prices. Concerned citizens across the
nation rightfully want to know where their money went during this winter's oil
crisis.
Figure 6: Home heating oil prices compares the retail and wholesale prices of
home heating oil to the "spot" price of crude oil for the period of October 10,
1989, to January 30, 1990. As Figure 6 reveals, the cost of crude oil remained
relatively constant throughout the crisis, while the margin between crude oil
and wholesale heating oil prices grew significantly wider during the month of
18 Testimony of Richard Slifka, Treasurer, Global Petroleum Corporation,
before the Massachusetts General Court, Joint Committee on Energy (January
16, 1990).
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Figure 6: Home heating oil prices
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December. Retail prices shadowed the wholesale trend.
Heating oil retailers assert that they did not make windfall profits during the
oil crisis. They point out that the margin between wholesale and retail oil
prices has remained fairly consistent all winter, and that profit margins actually
decreased at the peak of the oil crisis.
While they did not cause December's sudden surge in oil prices, retailers
certainly benefitted from it. It is true that the margin between wholesale and
retail oil prices remained fairly constant during the oil crisis, but this profit
margin has expanded in the aftermath of the crisis. From October 10 to
December 30, the margin between wholesale and retail prices stayed between 28
and 33 cents per gallon. By January 10, 1990, this profit margin increased to
17
almost 45 cents per gallon; and on January 30, 1990, the margin was still about
40 cents per gallon.
Oil retailers would have enjoyed significant profits even had their margins
stayed constant. Fixed costs for oil retailers remained relatively stable during
the oil crisis. As consumer demand for oil soared, retailers experienced record-
high sales volumes that translated into profits. Most likely, the profits derived
from the increased volume more than offset increased variable costs associated
with the crisis.
Wholesalers argue that they were not responsible for the huge increases in oil
prices either. Wholesalers that held large inventories at the beginning of the
winter season acknowledge that they made significant profits during the oil
crisis. However, according to an industry spokesman:
They may have made some profit in the last three weeks, but
they're not going to be able to hold on to it because this market
is going to go down just as fast as it went up. 19
As oil inventories are depleted to meet consumer demand, wholesalers have to
replenish their stock with higher-priced oil. Once the price of oil begins to
decline, inventory values decrease and wholesalers must absorb losses on their
oil.
Those most likely to have benefitted from this winter's crisis were companies
that had large inventories of oil and companies that were able to refine crude
oil into heating oil. As consumer demand for home heating oil surpassed
industry production, these companies began drawing from their inventory
reserves and were able to take advantage of higher oil prices. Although
production and delivery costs increased during the crisis, these additional costs
19 Paul Solman, "Heated Up."
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Figure 7: East-of-Rockies
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to the oil companies were more than offset by profits on oil from inventories.
While they made substantial profits on their inventories, oil companies provided
needed oil to the region. Figure 7: East-of-Rockies home heating oil supply
compares the volume of home heating oil provided by refinery production,
imports, and inventory "draw" in December 1988 and December 1989. Figure
7 reveals that while refineries increased daily production by 320,000 barrels—
or 12 percent—this December, this increase alone could not accommodate the
sudden surge in consumer demand.
In order to fill the need for home heating oil, an additional 321,000 barrels of
oil were drawn from industry inventories—an increase of over 200 percent from
the previous year's inventory draw. As shown in Figure 7 . inventory draw
accounted for 13 percent of the total volume of oil delivered to consumers in
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December 1989--a considerable increase over the 5 percent in December 1988.
This rise in inventory draw helped to ease some of the stress created by
increased consumer demand and decreased oil imports this winter.
RESPONSES TO THE OIL CRISIS
The problems faced by Massachusetts residents this winter were shared by many
throughout the United States. The severity of the oil crisis has provoked
widespread calls for investigations into the oil industry and for new legislation
to prevent future oil crises.
In response to these calls, the U.S. Justice Department is conducting a review
into the need for an investigation of the oil industry, and the U.S. Energy
Department has promised a full report on the crisis by June 1990. Meanwhile,
federal legislators, including members of the Massachusetts congressional
delegation, have called for emergency fuel assistance funds to help those
hardest-hit by the oil crisis.
Federal legislation has also been proposed to establish nation-wide regional
reserves of refined oil products.21 Such reserves would act as an emergency
source of fuel to alleviate the kind of shortages that New England suffered this
winter. In addition, state and federal officials have called for amending the
Jones Act to allow for specific defense and consumer emergency waivers.
At the state level, the Massachusetts Joint Committee on Energy held a public
20 Solman, "Heated Up."
21 Testimony of Senator John F. Kerry before the Massachusetts General
Court, Joint Committee on Energy (January 16, 1990).
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hearing on January 16, 1990, with Governor Michael Dukakis, Energy
Commissioner Paul Gromer, members of the oil industry, and others to discuss
reasons for the oil crisis and ways to avoid future crises. The Committee
expects to issue a report analyzing the oil crisis sometime this spring.
The state's Energy Office, which compiled much of the raw data used in this
report, has been monitoring the home heating oil situation. Their activities
include daily oversight of wholesale oil prices, weekly surveillance of
Massachusetts retail oil prices, and continued communication with other state
and federal offices concerned with the oil situation.
LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The home heating oil crisis this winter was due to a unique combination of
factors. Some of these factors—record-low temperatures, the premature onset of
winter, and oil refinery disasters—could not have been predicted and cannot be
prevented. Other factors such as oil inventory levels and availability of oil-
transporting vessels are controllable, however. Without appropriate monitoring
of these factors, the experience of December 1989 could be repeated.
The Senate Committee on Post Audit and Oversight therefore makes the
following recommendations:
1. The state's Energy Office should work with the U.S. Energy Department to
examine the feasibility and risks of a regional oil reserve system.
A system of regional reserves has been suggested by political leaders across the
country to alleviate fuel shortages in the future. Over the past several years,
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the Massachusetts Energy Office has asked the U.S. Energy Department to
establish such a reserve system. However, no action to establish a regional
reserve system has occurred at the federal level.
Regional reserves may prove useful in future emergencies, but they raise some
difficult questions. For example, who should hold the reserves, when will they
be used, and how will they be distributed? If wholesalers are required to hold
the reserve oil, who will compensate them for the additional operating and
insurance costs? And perhaps most important, what should be the minimum
reserve maintained in these inventories?
Even if these questions were answered, regional reserves could create additional
problems. One regional oil dealer, speaking at a legislative hearing on home
heating oil prices, admitted that wholesalers would be more likely to narrow
their own inventories if they knew government oil reserves were available for
emergencies. Such a reduction of inventory margins would defeat the original
intent of the reserve system.
At the same time, oil consumers may find that prices are not as competitive with
a regional reserve system. Oil industry participants would not be able to take
full advantage of the futures market if they were required to maintain
minimum levels of inventory. This could result in greater risks for the oil
industry and higher prices for consumers.
These questions and problems must be considered before a nation-wide regional
reserve system can be established. Because of the nature of the oil industry,
individual states cannot realistically maintain their own reserve system. It is
therefore imperative that the federal government take the initiative in weighing
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the costs and benefits of a regional oil reserve system.
2, The federal government should re-examine the procedures for granting
waivers to the "Jones Act." particularly in light of emergency situations such as
the oil crisis.
The "Jones Act" gives U.S. vessels an advantage over foreign vessels in the
business of domestic transportation. However, the Act may produce harmful
effects under certain circumstances—effects that the federal government should
bear in mind when considering waivers to the Act.
For example, if a city such as Boston needs oil—domestic or foreign— that is
sitting in a foreign vessel in another U.S. port, the oil has to be removed from
the foreign vessel into a U.S. vessel before it can leave for Boston. This can be
a costly and time-consuming process, creating higher oil prices and increasing
port congestion.
In addition, all domcstically-rcfincd oil must be shipped in U.S. vessels. When
demand for and production of domestic oil reach the record levels of this
winter, U.S. vessels may not be sufficient in number to transport the oil from
refineries to consumers. In such situations, foreign refineries and vessels could
enjoy an advantage over their U.S. counterparts.
Furthermore, critics of the Jones Act claim that the waiver process docs not
work for time-sensitive requests. According to the Wall Street Journal , two
foreign ships had to wait five or six days at the peak of the oil crisis before a
waiver was ultimately granted; by that time, the ships had already left to pick
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up cargoes elsewhere. 22 Shipping companies often cannot afford to wait for
waiver approvals, since idle vessels can cost owners $30,000 per day. 23
In another instance, a Connecticut-based fuel company recounts that it
requested a waiver to the Jonts Act in order to deliver oil cargo to New York
by a contracted due date of January 15, 1990. The Customs Service denied the
request, based on the finding that there were enough U.S. ships to handle the
cargo. According to the fuel company, no ships were actually available until
early February. 24
The waiver process for the Jones Act was designed to work for national defense
purposes, not necessarily to respond to consumer crises. However, federal
investigation into the implementation and enforcement of the Jones Act may
help to alleviate some of the concerns expressed by consumers, the oil industry,
and Energy Department officials alike. Statutory or regulatory changes to the
Jones Act may be required in order to alleviate future shortages in shipping
vessels.
3. The state should provide continued financial and political support for
monitoring oil inventories and prices.
Continued monitoring by the state of oil inventories and prices would help to
anticipate shortages or problems in the oil supply. Speaking before the
Massachusetts Joint Committee on Energy, representatives from the oil industry
have expressed their willingness to provide such information to the state.
22 Sullivan, "Maritime Agency Blocked.'
23 Sullivan, "Maritime Agency Blocked."
24 Sullivan, "Maritime Agency Blocked."
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The state entity best able to collect this information is the Massachusetts Energy
Office. The Energy Office currently surveys retail heating oil prices, compiles
wholesale oil prices and inventory levels, and gathers other relevant
information. However, the Energy Office has recently been restructured,
experiencing reductions in both funding and staff. Ironically, these changes
occurred just before the crisis arose in home heating oil.
If fuel inventories and prices are to be monitored, the state has to provide
sufficient financial and political support for these activities. Moreover, since
monitoring programs are of little use if they are dismantled immediately after
a crisis, the state must maintain continued support for these programs. Without
such support, Massachusetts consumers may be at risk for another oil crisis in
the future.
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